Bayesian Methodology As a Tool for Scientific Confirmation by Majszak, Mason
Bayesian Methodology As a Tool for Scientific Confirmation 7 
Bayesian Methodology As a Tool for 
Scientific Confirmation 
Mason Majszak 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Introduction 
Under what conditions can scientists confirm their hy-
potheses? Karl Popper, a 20th century philosopher of science, was 
opposed to the necessity of confirmation as being “an essential 
part of science”.1 Others have disagreed with Popper, illustrating 
the need for a theory of scientific confirmation rather than hold-
ing scientific inquiry as a practice of falsification. From this de-
sire, theories of confirmation arose, like the hypothetico-
deductive model and Bayesianism, as a way to explain how scien-
tific hypotheses are confirmed. 
This paper explores the confirmation of hypotheses in sci-
ence, looking at the positives and negatives of using Bayesian 
probability as an account which offers an explanation of the 
method of hypothesis confirmation. I begin with a discussion of 
Probability Theory, covering two main interpretations: the fre-
quency interpretation of probability and the subjective interpreta-
tion of probability. From this, I highlight the subjective interpre-
tation and illustrate how degrees of beliefs can be expressed 
through mathematics as an assigned probability value, which is 
ascribed to each belief. In light of this, I will show that Bayes’ 
Theorem can relate conditional probabilities and outside infor-
mation as a way to alter and improve the probability value of the 
prior probability. Where this outside information provides a prob-
ability value not derived from an individual’s degree of confi-
dence but rather from a source distinct from the person. 
When discussing probability, individuals tend to appeal to 
one of the main interpretations of Probability Theory, either the 
frequentist or subjective interpretation. Individuals rarely utilize 
probability values derived from methodology outside of the given 
interpretation they hold, and rather try to define the probability 
value in a way that fits within their given interpretation. I main-
tain that based on the mathematics of probability this is not neces-
sary, one can begin with a subjective prior probability and use a 
frequentist derived conditionalized probability to improve the pri-
or probability. I illustrate how this can be done using an equation 
derived from Bayes’ Theorem. Ultimately, I conclude this section 
by arguing that through the addition of new information, regard-
less of how it is derived, Bayes’ Theorem illustrates that individu-
als can have a stronger base for reasoning, which will in turn cre-
ate a more informed mind to assign probabilities. 
Given the mathematics of Bayesian Probability, I move to 
a discussion regarding how Bayesian methodology can be used 
for confirmation of hypotheses in science. This account of confir-
mation will be contrasted with the hypothetico-deductive model. 
From this contrast I argue that by using Bayesian methodology 
the main shortcomings of the hypothetico-deductive model can be 
avoided. I then illustrate an argument against Bayes’ theory, giv-
en by Peter Godfrey-Smith, which highlights that the subjective 
prior probabilities can vary greatly between scientists. This differ-
ence in the priors will then cause, as he argues, the posterior prob-
abilities to be wildly different, in turn illustrating how this meth-
odology cannot be used as an account of confirmation. I provide 
reasons against this notion, describing how with enough infor-
mation the posterior probabilities begin to converge on a similar 
value.  
A second argument against the Bayesian method, de-
scribed by Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, will argue that a sub-
jective interpretation cannot supply science with the required ob-
jectivity to provide the necessary authority of scientific 
knowledge. I maintain that the notion of objectivity in scientific 
inquiry described by Howson and Urbach is too strict. I will ra-
ther argue that a more flexible notion of objectivity, which more 
closely resembles a rationality requirement, is more appropriate 
for scientific inquiry.  
From this rationality requirement, I argue that scientists 
are uniquely positioned to assign probability values because they 
have a more informed background for assigning subjective proba-
bilities. Ultimately, I conclude that the Bayesian method is useful 
for the confirmation of scientific hypotheses because it allows for 
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the avoidance of many shortcomings normally associated with 
confirmation in science, while also providing the rationality re-
quirement and thus maintaining the authority of scientific inquiry. 
Probability Theory 
 First, I begin with an introduction to Probability Theory to 
establish a baseline for my further discussion of Bayes’ Theorem. 
There are multiple interpretations of Probability Theory and I will 
be focusing on the frequentist interpretation and the subjective 
interpretation, as they are the two interpretations necessary for the 
arguments that follow. The frequentist interpretation of probabil-
ity posits “that relative frequencies bear an intimate relationship 
to probability”.2 In other words, the probabilities can be seen as 
directly connected to the events within the reference class. Due to 
this connection, the frequency interpretation takes probability as 
the frequency of an event’s occurrence or the rate of a certain out-
come of the event.  
In the frequency interpretation, one “might identify the 
probability of ‘heads’ on a certain coin with the frequency of 
heads in a suitable sequence of tosses of the coin, divided by the 
total number of tosses”.3 This example gives a more detailed ex-
planation of what probability means in the finite frequency inter-
pretation, there are frequentists who consider infinite reference 
classes rather than finite, but this distinction goes beyond the 
needs of this paper. The example of the coin begins with an indi-
vidual first observing how many actual outcomes of an event are 
the desired outcomes. By desired outcome I mean the outcome 
whose probability you are trying to calculate. From this, an indi-
vidual would take the number of all the observed desired out-
comes and divide it by the number of total observed events. This 
ratio would show the proportion of the desired event against the 
total number of events. Proportions can then be seen as the proba-
bility of observing the desired event in the future, according to 
frequency interpretations method. By looking at probability 
through the lens of the frequency interpretation, we give the same 
weight to each event regardless of where any single event is locat-
ed in a string of events. In other words, the specific time value of 
an event has no bearing on the probability of an event, given that 
all the relevant conditions remain the same.   
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The way an event is framed also presents a difficulty to 
the use of the frequentist interpretation. Take that I want to calcu-
late the probability of me living to the age of 100. The event of 
me living to 100 must be framed by my living in the 21st century 
with certain medical advances not available to previous genera-
tions, that don’t smoke, that I exercise regularly and so on. In 
light of this, the relative frequency must be revised to the event’s 
reference class, the list of attributes I described. This poses a 
problem because there would be no single answer given by the 
frequentist, there would be a probability given living in 21st cen-
tury, a probability given that I don’t smoke, a probability given 
that I exercise regularly and so on. 
The second interpretation of interest is the subjective in-
terpretation of probability; this interpretation will be the focus of 
this paper as it is the interpretation used in Bayesian Probability. 
Subjectivist interpretation “treats the probabilities of theories as a 
property of our attitude towards them; such probabilities are then 
interpreted, roughly speaking, as measuring degrees of belief”.4 
First, I will illustrate what this sentence is trying to articulate 
when utilizing the term “theories”. Through our everyday lives 
we go into the world around us and have experiences, we have 
these experiences by perceiving the world and bringing all this 
information together to create experiences. In some cases, we re-
member specific experiences and store them in our memory. At a 
later time, we may then reflect on these memories of our experi-
ences and try to understand different aspects of the specific expe-
riences. Once we gain an understanding of our specific experienc-
es of the world we begin to group similar experiences together 
and make connections between what we see as interrelated expe-
riences. By assembling these relationships between ideas we are 
beginning to construct our theories about the universe. When we 
see and understand connections between events we begin to be-
lieve that they are connected in reality and thus we create proposi-
tions. This shows what is meant by ‘theories’ in the above sen-
tence, the beliefs that we have about the world based on our pre-
vious experiences. 
In light of this, I can look at subjective probability and 
illustrate what it entails in relation to these propositions about the 
world. To do this we must return to the first part of the definition, 
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specifically when it is stated that subjective probability “treats the 
probabilities of theories as a property of our attitude towards 
them”.5 This means that a person’s attitude toward a sentence can 
be considered as a value of how probable that individual takes the 
sentence to be. This assigning probability can be shown in the 
following question that a person might ask of himself. How much 
probability do I assign, do I give to the sentence? In other words, 
we assign a probability value for a given belief that reflects our 
attitude toward the belief. This allows us to understand probabil-
ity as simply measuring the degrees of belief based on our atti-
tudes of the validity of belief. We can better understand this no-
tion if we think of assigning these degrees of belief as assigning 
degrees of confidence. These degrees of confidence would be a 
relation of how certain I am that a belief I hold is likely to be. 
From this attitude about the belief I would be able to assign a spe-
cific probability value.  
Degrees of confidence can also be ordered or put on a 
scale of probability based on the number we assign. This scale of 
degrees of confidence can be illustrated with a simple example of 
two beliefs. Let’s say that I have a belief that ‘2+2=4’ and also a 
belief that ‘the planet Venus is bigger than the planet Mars’. Now 
let’s say I am confident that the sentence ‘2+2=4’ is true due to a 
set of multiple reasons. My reasoning for the belief stems from 
some knowledge that I have gained from grade school about the 
values of integers, as well as my development of additive reason-
ing skills, allowing me to come to the understanding that these 
specific values when added together produce the answer of 4. 
From this reasoning I would then have confidence in the truth of 
the sentence and in turn I would assign a probability based on this 
confidence. My degree of confidence in the other belief sentence, 
‘the planet Venus is bigger than the planet Mars’, might be based 
on different set of reasoning. This reasoning may arise from the 
fact that I have once overheard a conversation between two indi-
viduals when one said that ‘the planet Venus is bigger than the 
planet Mars’. From this reasoning I would have some degree of 
confidence in the validity of the sentence, which would then al-
low me to assign a probability value that reflects this degree of 
confidence.  
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When assigning probabilities we use a scale from 0 to 1, 
with 0 being no chance that the sentence reflects the universe and 
1 being 100% certainty that the sentence reflects the universe. 
This means that for our example I may assign to the first belief a 
probability value of 0.99, which would be written as P(‘2+2=4’) = 
0.99. In other words, I assigned a probability to this sentence that 
reflects the certainty I have in the belief. By my assigning this 
specific probability, it reflects my relative high degree of confi-
dence in the sentence. Due to my reasoning and understanding of 
mathematics, I have near total confidence in the sentence ‘2+2=4’ 
as being true. Now in the case of the other sentence I may assign 
a probability value of 0.05, which would be written as P(‘the 
planet Venus is bigger than the planet Mars’) = 0.05. Due to the 
fact that I assigned this specific probability it reflects the relative 
level of confidence I have in this belief. Similar to the previous 
sentence this relative degree of confidence is developed from my 
reasoning about the sentence. This reasoning is based on the little 
understanding I have about the relationship between the sizes of 
planets in our solar system. From this we can look at these two 
distinct probability values on a scale and see that I assigned a 
much larger probability to the first sentence than I did to the sec-
ond sentence. I showed that this assigning of values was due to 
my underlying degree of confidence in the two distinct beliefs, 
which more importantly reflects the reasoning I had to believe the 
sentence. Due to my increased knowledge of mathematics and the 
relatively easy mathematical equation I could have much greater 
certainty in believing the sentence ‘2+2=4’. Conversely my lim-
ited knowledge of the two planets closest to earth resulted in me 
not having a relatively high level of confidence in believing the 
sentence ‘the planet Venus is bigger than the planet Mars’.  
Conditional Relationship of Beliefs 
How do we then change our degree of confidence in our 
beliefs so that we can increase the probability value we assign to 
our beliefs?  So far we have discussed subjective probability as it 
relates to single beliefs, where we treated belief sentences as if 
they had no necessary connection to any other belief sentences. 
Now we will discuss the subjective probability of conditional be-
liefs where we consider our beliefs as having a relationship to our 
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other beliefs. This will demonstrate the critical notion of interrela-
tionship between our beliefs, which I will show affects the proba-
bility value of a belief. Conditional beliefs can be understood as 
“beliefs about what the world would be like given that particular 
things happen”.6 In other words, our degree of confidence in a 
belief is influenced by other beliefs that we hold. Due to the influ-
ence of other beliefs our understanding of probability no longer 
has a one variable sentence P(A) but rather a sentence resulting in 
P(A | B), showing the relationship of the influential belief. This 
new sentence can be defined as the probability of A given the 
probability of B, conditional on B. This probability value as-
signed to the P(A | B) can be expressed by P(A | B) = P(A & B)/P
(B). In other words, this equation is stating that the conditional 
probability of A given B is relative to the proportion of outcomes 
where B outcomes are also A outcomes.  
In the following example we will see how other beliefs 
influence the degree of probability I assigned to a particular belief 
sentenc-es. The sentence I will take as my belief will be ‘it is 
going to rain today’; this is our belief A. Let’s say I looked at a 
weather fore-cast and saw a slight chance of rain was predicted 
for today. I then reason from this experience and recall that 
weather forecasts are not accurate one hundred percent of the 
time. From my rea-soning I assign a probability value that reflects 
my degree of con-fidence. This results in me assigning a value of 
P(A) = 0.2 to the belief.  
I also have a second belief, ‘it is cloudy outside’; this will 
be my belief B. Earlier in the day I looked outside my window 
and perceived that it appeared to be cloudy. I then presume that 
my senses are trustworthy and from this, reason that my experi-
ence of the sky being cloudy was accurate. I also reason that not 
much time has passed. Based on this reasoning I have a specific 
degree of confidence that it is currently cloudy outside so I assign 
a probability value P(B) = 0.8. Now I must consider the probabil-
ity that it will both be raining and cloudy, this is our P(A & B). In 
other words, this means the probability that both of these events 
will occur together. This value cannot be greater than the proba-
bility of P(B) because I remember some moments when it was 
cloudy outside and not raining. Due to these memories I assign P
(A & B) = 0.3 to reflect the confidence I have in A and B occur-
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ring simultaneously. From these probabilities we can calculate the 
conditional probability that it will rain today given that it is 
cloudy today, expressed as P(A | B). This probability can be cal-
culated by inserting our probability values into this relationship P
(A | B) = P(A & B)/P(B). So now we take those values, 0.3 / 0.8, 
and find that the probability that it will be raining today given that 
it is cloudy has a value of P(A | B) = 0.375. This is a larger value 
then the value we originally assigned to the sentence ‘it is going 
to rain today’, which we assigned a value of 0.2. The observation 
of cloudiness led to me raising the probability of A. The increase 
illustrates that the probability of A is now conditional on B. We 
can say that there exists a conditional relationship because we 
found a change in the probability value of A to the probability of 
A given the probability of B. If the two beliefs were not condi-
tionally related then the two probability values, P(A) and P(A | 
B), would have been equal to each other. If the probability value 
for A would have been larger than the probability for A given B, 
then we could say that B has a negative conditional relationship 
with the probability of A. This means that B would not have sup-
ported A and would have acted against A, resulting in the lower-
ing of the probability value for A. This was not the case however 
as in our example we found an increase in the probability of A 
given B verses the probability of A on its own. This increase in 
the probability values means that B helps to give us greater confi-
dence in A, which in turn increases A’s probability. In other 
words, our future degree of confidence in a prior belief can be 
increased or decreased based on other beliefs that qualify the pri-
or belief.  
Bayesian Probability – The Mathematics 
Now that we have an understanding of conditional proba-
bilities we can attempt to decipher Bayes’ Theorem. This theorem 
states “the probability of the hypothesis conditional on the evi-
dence (or the posterior probability of the hypothesis) is equal to 
the probability of the data conditional on the hypothesis (or likeli-
hood of the hypothesis) times the probability (the so-called prior 
probability) of the hypothesis, all divided by the probability of the 
data”.7 Let us analyze this definition using terms similar to those 
used in the previous section as a way to maintain consistency and 
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better understand the meaning. First the definition is saying that 
the probability of A is conditional on B. With P(A) also being 
referred to as the prior probability, meaning the probability value 
given before taking into account any influence by P(B). At first 
glance this seems to be exactly the same as the conditional proba-
bility we just illustrated, this is partially correct but with a small 
twist. This small twist is that the theorem takes into account the 
probability of B as also being conditional on the probability of A. 
In our previous discussion of conditional probability, P(A) was 
only influenced by P(B), we did not take P(B) to be influenced by 
P(A).  
This probability value for B given A must be attained 
from external information; this is due to “the data conditional on 
the hypothesis”.8 In other words, the P(B | A) is representing a 
conditional relationship between the two beliefs. This data regard-
ing the relationship must be derived from outside the individual 
due to the fact that the individual has no knowledge of the rela-
tionship between the beliefs. This means that the individual 
would not be able to assign a probability value based on some 
degree of confidence in the belief, because they don’t have a be-
lief regarding this relationship. The data then must be acquired 
from the world in a way that is distinct form the individuals as-
signing of probability values.  
We can now illustrate that the full theorem is stating that 
the P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / P(B). From the equation we can 
see that Bayes’ Theorem, at its core, relates conditional probabili-
ties with external information. This is shown by the two condi-
tional probabilities, P(A | B) and P(B | A), in the equation and the 
subsequent probabilities, P(A) and P(B), demonstrating how the 
conditional probabilities are related. Let us look at an example to 
better grasp this relation of conditional probabilities. 
An example of Bayes’ Theorem would be as follows; let’s 
say I am trying to determine if the belief that I have developed 
melanoma (skin cancer) is influenced by my belief that I have 
been repeatedly sunburnt. To accomplish this, I will use my belief 
‘I have melanoma’ as belief M. Now the fact that melanoma 
doesn’t run in my family leads me to reason that my chances for 
having melanoma are quite low. I then have a confidence level in 
belief M that is based on this reasoning. The degree of confidence 
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 Belief S would be that ‘I have been repeatedly sunburnt’. I 
believe that I have been repeatedly sunburnt due to my memory 
of many summers working outdoors. Due to this reasoning I have 
a degree of confidence that allows me to assign a probability val-
ue of P(S) = 0.5. Now, let us take it hypothetically that I have 
read medical journals and found that of people who develop mel-
anoma 80% of them had also been repeatedly sunburnt in their 
lifetimes. This external information gives me the probability val-
ue P(S | M) = 0.8, which means the probability of a person to 
have been repeatedly sunburnt given that this person has melano-
ma. From this information and our degree of confidence derived 
probability values we can find the conditional probability of M 
given S. The conditional probability being that I have skin cancer 
given that I have been repeatedly sunburnt. We plug the values 
into the probability equation P(M | S) = P(S | M) x P(M) / P(S) 
and find that P(M | S) = 0.8 x 0.1/ 0.5 meaning that P(M | S) = 
0.16. This is a slight increase from the probability that I assigned 
to my belief M. This means the probability of S led me to raise 
the probability of the M. In other words, my belief that I have 
melanoma is now conditional on my belief that I have been re-
peatedly sunburnt; given that there is a positive conditional prob-
ability that people who have been repeatedly sunburnt have mela-
noma.  
 This example shows how Bayes’ Theorem can relate con-
ditional probabilities with external information. Let us look at ex-
actly what I mean when I say we used Bayes’ Theorem to relate 
external information to a conditional probability. In our example 
the value of the conditional probability P(S | M) originated from 
external information that related the two beliefs we were discuss-
ing. This was the outside medical journal I referenced that gave 
us P(S | M) = 0.8. In other words, we took the statistics of a 
known relationship and used the value to help inform us about the 
relationship we were trying to find. After we put this information 
into our expression of the relationship between me having mela-
noma given that I have been repeatedly sunburnt it allowed us 
update the probability of the belief. By updating my belief I was 
able to increase the probability of the belief, which was illustrated 
by the value of the calculated conditional probability, P(M | S) = 
0.16 was greater than the assigned probability P(M) = 0.1. This 
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updating of probability does not need to result in a positive in-
crease in probability. We can have new information that results in 
the decreasing in the probability of my belief. This would have 
been shown by P(M | S) being less than the original P(M). Final-
ly, our updating of beliefs need not be a one-time occurrence ei-
ther, we can continually use new information to alter the probabil-
ities of our beliefs and change their values. To be clear by updat-
ing beliefs we are not increasing their probability of reflecting the 
world but are rather improving our understanding of the relevant 
information and from this altering the probabilities we assign to 
our belief accordingly. 
Bayesian Probability – Reliability and Reason 
With the addition of new information we can improve our 
probability values, but how does this affect the believer, the indi-
vidual holding the belief? I will now discuss what it means for us 
to be good knowers. Ultimately looking at how our ability to be 
good knowers can affect the reliability of testimony. Ian Hacking 
suggests that testimony cannot be the only consideration in our 
reasoning about a situation because testimony does not take into 
account the “base rates” involved in events.9 From this, we can 
see there are underlying probabilities that the individual some-
times does not take into account when judging if a person is trust-
worthy. I will use an example to better illustrate what these base 
rates in Bayes’ Theorem actually consists of. Let’s say that you 
are on a farm that has 1 horse and 9 cows. On a rainy day there is 
an animal that breaks the barn door wide open. A person who saw 
the event says it was a horse that broke the barn door. This person 
is then tested under similar rainy conditions and it is determined 
that this person was able to correctly identify the type of animal, 
horse or cow, 80% of the time. Based on this information most 
people would consider this person as relatively trustworthy re-
garding this type of observation, as this person has a high record 
of picking the correct animal. From this perceived trustworthiness 
we would reason to the conclusion that the probability of the ani-
mal that broke the door being a horse would be P(H)=0.8 because 
the person is right 80% of the time. This reasoning that she is 
trustworthy and that the probability value of P(H)=0.8 is incorrect 
due to not considering the base rate that is involved in the proba-
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bility equation. If we put this into the Bayesian Probability model 
we can more accurately illustrate this notion.  
To explain the influence of the base rate, I will use Bayes’ Theo-
rem as it relates two hypotheses that are mutually exclusive. We 
can consider the above example as having hypotheses that are 
“mutually exclusive and, exhaustive” because the animal to break 
the barn door was either a horse or a cow, it could not have been 
both so it must have been one or the other.10 For Bayes’ Theorem, 
this means that we will have a slightly altered equation than what 
was shown before, to represent the two mutually exclusive hy-
potheses. For the new equation I will use the variables A and ~A 
to represent the mutually exclusive hypotheses. The variables A 
and ~A do not pertain to the above example and are used only to 
build the new equation. This distinction between A and ~A is our 
base rate or the background information necessary to calculate the 
probability value for P(A | B), meaning it is crucial to be added 
into our equation. We can derive the new iteration of the Bayesi-
an equation with the ~A included in the calculation. The equation 
that we used before was P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / P(B), which 
doesn’t include our ~A. But when we consider that A and ~A are 
mutually exclusive we can state that the P(B) = P(A) x P(B | A) + 
P(~A) x P(B | ~ A). From this we can plug the expression into our 
equation we have a result of P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / [P(A) x 
P(B | A) + P(~A ) x P(B | ~A)].  
 Now we will see how this equation works in the context 
of the previous example regarding the horse and barn. The hy-
pothesis A we are trying to show is that ‘A horse broke the barn 
door’. This value for the probability that a horse broke the door is 
P(A) = 0.1, since 10% of the animals who could have knocked 
down the door were horses. Our second hypothesis would then be 
that it was a cow that broke the barn door. Since the two hypothe-
ses are mutually exclusive the probability value of P(~A) = 0.9, 
representing the percentage of potential animals that are cows 
who could have knocked down the barn door. The probability 
value that it was a horse given that the individual perceived the 
correct type of farm animal will be P(B | A) and can be acquired 
by testing the individual who observed the event. This probability 
value would be derived from a frequentist interpretation of Proba-
bility theory, which relies on a set of observation and creates a 
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ratio to show the proportion of the desired event against the total 
number of events in the given set. In the example, the testing of 
the individual who saw the event fulfills this frequentist deriva-
tion, the test found the individual was correct 80% of the time, 
this gives the probability value P(B | A) = 0.8. Finally, our proba-
bility value that it was cow given that the individual perceived the 
correct type of farm animal will be P(B | A) = 0.2. This probabil-
ity value is derived based on the percentage of the time the ob-
server was incorrect, 20% of the time. We can put these values 
into Bayes’ Theorem and see P(A | B) = (0.8 x 0.1)/[(0.8 x 0.1) + 
(0.9 x 0.2)] = 0.31. From this probability value of P(A | B) = 0.31 
we can say that P(~A | B) = 0.69 because the two hypothesis are 
mutually exclusive, 1 – 0.31 = 0.69. It is more likely that a cow 
broke the barn door rather than a horse, 0.69 > 0.31. Due to the 
fact that these equations utilized probability values derived from 
two different interpretations of probability theory I maintain that 
individuals no longer need to interpret probability values using 
only one interpretation of Probability Theory. It is important to 
note that the testimony of the individual is relevant to the equa-
tion. The input of testimony in the equation illustrates that even 
with the testimony of what many individuals would consider a 
credible source there is still a greater probability that the animal 
to break the barn door was a cow. This ultimately shows that we 
should not rely solely on the individual, who said it was a horse, 
due to the baseline information showing there was greater likeli-
hood that it was a cow.  
The base rate or relevant background information is key 
for understanding trustworthiness because when it is not taken 
into account we rely exclusively on testimony and it is always a 
mistake to rely solely on testimony, when relevant baseline infor-
mation is available. This was shown in the example where most 
individuals would have taken the testimony of the individual who 
observed the event. From this we can state that we require this 
base rate to assess our confidence in a belief because having 
knowledge of background information affects the probability of 
the belief. Ultimately then if we are to be good knowers then we 
must take all relative information and apply it to our beliefs as a 
way to have the most accurate probability. We must see reliability 
and trustworthiness as a function of the impact a person’s relevant 
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level of information has on their corresponding degree of confi-
dence. To understand how relevant background information is 
required for trustworthiness we must turn to how our degree of 
confidence in produced.  
Finally, I will analyze how applying all relevant infor-
mation can influence our degree of confidence in our probabili-
ties. I will begin by examining how new information influences 
our confidence in beliefs as it relates to our feelings of uncertainty 
about beliefs. This type of understanding regarding Bayes’ Theo-
rem and how the theorem relates to background information is 
shown when James Stone states, “Bayesians consider probability 
to be a measure of uncertainty regarding their knowledge of the 
physical world”.11 For Bayesians, their knowledge of the world 
around them is related to their level of uncertainty or degree of 
confidence in their beliefs. If we are more certain about our be-
liefs then the probabilities will reflect this change in degree of 
confidence. To change our confidence in a belief we need to have 
relevant information regarding that belief. From this it can be stat-
ed that when we have relevant information about the world we 
can improve our probability values.  
This is ultimately how Bayes’ Theorem improves confi-
dence of our beliefs, we gain new information about the world, 
which allows us to reason from the information and build confi-
dence in the belief. When the relevant information reflects the 
world and our confidence reflects the level of reasoning we have 
in the belief then the confidence is trustworthy. This will then 
eliminate an excessive or irrational concern about relying on high 
confidence probabilities because the confidence is based in rea-
soning about relative information. From this we must say that a 
person’s testimony with higher amounts of relevant information 
must be considered more reliable than one without adequate in-
formation. This ultimately shows that probability favors the pre-
pared or well-informed mind because those with more infor-
mation have the ability to have a representative degree of confi-
dence in the belief for which they assign a probability. 
Bayesian Probability and Scientific Confirmation 
Given the mathematics of Bayesian probability, the meth-




scientific inquiry. As was shown, Bayes’ Theorem represents the 
relationship between beliefs by the equation P(A | B) = P(B | A) x 
P(A) / P(B), but let us look at how this relates to the confirmation 
of scientific hypotheses. The probability value P(A) is our prior 
probability, this is the probability that the individual assigns to a 
hypothesis before taking into account any evidence. The probabil-
ity value P(B) is value assigned to the information or evidence 
being used to either support or refute the hypothesis, A. The re-
maining two probability values are conditional probabilities. The 
probability value P(A | B) represents the posterior probability, the 
probability of the hypothesis after the evidence is considered. The 
probability value P(B | A) is a measurement of “how likely the 
evidence is given the hypothesis”.12 This conditional probability 
value denotes the degree to which the hypothesis predicts the out-
come given the evidence or information. If the posterior probabil-
ity, P(A | B), is greater than the prior probability, P(A), then the 
evidence supports the hypothesis. Correspondingly, if the posteri-
or probability is less than the prior probability then the evidence 
refutes the hypothesis. Given this, it can be stated that with 
enough supporting information we can confirm hypotheses in sci-
ence using Bayesian Probability values. 
Confirmation by evidence is incredibly important to sci-
ence, but scientific inquiry is also particular on the breadth of evi-
dence and types of experimentation needed to confirm a hypothe-
sis. In other words, a single type of evidence found using the one 
experiment couldn’t confirm the totality of a theory. An example 
of this would be that we couldn’t confirm the theory of gravity by 
simply dropping a pencil over and over again and use this evi-
dence to confirm the hypothesis. Different experiments must be 
conducted to confirm the hypothesis; this is the reason why meas-
uring the movement of planets is also done to confirm the theory 
of gravity. The need of multiple types of evidence is expressed in 
the Bayesian method because there is a diminishing return on 
confirmation if a single type of evidence is continuously used. I 
will use an example to illustrate how this shrinking return on con-
formation is accounted for in the Bayesian model.  
Take some hypothesis A, based on our degree of confi-
dence in the hypothesis we assign P(A) = 0.2. Given this relative-
ly low probability value for the hypothesis we would also expect 
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to see a low value for P(B), the probability of the evidence B. 
From this we assign a P(B) = 0.4. Suppose that the evidence was 
found to follow from the hypothesis, this would give us a proba-
bility value for P(B | A) = 1. If we insert these values into Bayes’ 
Theorem, P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / P(B), we find that P(A | B) 
= 1 x 0.2 / 0.4 = 0.5. This shows that the evidence confirms the 
hypothesis A. The interesting question however is what will hap-
pen if we use the evidence, B, in an attempt to confirm the same 
hypothesis. 
If we were to repeat the same experiment to confirm hy-
pothesis A by finding the evidence B, our probability values 
would be slightly different. Our initial probability value would 
now be 0.5 because of the previous evidence we found, meaning 
P(A) = 0.5. We would have the same value for P(B | A) because 
the fact that the evidence follows from the hypothesis did not 
change, meaning P(B | A) = 1. The probability value for evidence 
B changes because we have previously experienced this evidence 
confirming the hypothesis. By having a previous experience of 
the evidence being used to support the hypothesis the degree of 
confidence in the evidence changes. There is now a higher degree 
of confidence that the evidence B will also support the hypothesis 
in the future, meaning our P(B) increases. Due to this increased 
degree of confidence we assign P(B) = 0.8. We can now input 
these values into Bayes’ Theorem to see how the same evidence 
changes the posterior probability of the hypothesis, P(A | B) = 1 x 
0.5 / 0.8 = 0.625. This new posterior probability only slightly in-
creased the probability value from 0.5 to 0.625. In light of this 
example, it can be seen that “each time the theory is confirmed by 
that kind of evidence, then the probability expressing the degree 
of belief that it will do so in the future gradually increases”.13 In 
other words, when the same evidence is used to support the hy-
pothesis the evidence becomes less influential in the probability 
equation. Thus the margin between the prior and posterior proba-
bilities of hypothesis A will only get smaller and smaller the more 
times evidence B is used to support hypothesis A because we will 
be more and more confident that evidence B will occur. Due to 
only one type of evidence having a diminishing return on confir-




reflects scientific inquiry requiring multiple types of evidence be-
ing used to confirm a hypothesis.  
 
The Hypothetico-Deductive Model 
In light of how Bayesian probability can be used for con-
firmation of hypotheses in science, let us examine the classic 
method for confirmation in the scientific method, the hypothetico
-deductive model. In this model “we confirm a scientific hypothe-
sis by deducing from it…an observational prediction that turns 
out to be true”.14 In other words, scientific inquiry begins with the 
formulation of a hypothesis; we then conduct observations and 
experiments to test the hypothesis against the empirical data. This 
testing of the hypothesis will either verify or disprove the hypoth-
esis, meaning we will then be able to consider the hypothesis to 
be either confirmed or disconfirmed. From this, we can see this 
method allows scientists to deduce observations about the world 
from their hypotheses.  
This methodology is not without its shortcomings. There 
are a few well-known deficiencies for the hypothetico-deductive 
model for confirmation of hypotheses in science; I will touch on 
two of these shortcomings. The first being, “it does not take ac-
count of alternative hypotheses that might be invoked to explain 
the same prediction”.15 In other words, this model does not give 
an explanation for a situation where two different hypotheses can 
explain the same outcome being observed. For this model each 
theory is equally valid if it can explain the evidence. This means 
that this methodology cannot offer any insight in choosing or se-
lecting between two theories. We have no evidential grounds to 
justify choosing or preferring between two hypotheses that are 
considered equally valid.   
We can turn to ecology for an example of two theories 
that can equally explain the evidence. Say you are an explorer in 
the Pacific Ocean and come across an uncharted island, on this 
island is a small species of bird that bears a resemblance to a spe-
cies found on the mainland. The mainland is 5,000 miles away 
from this island, much too far for this small bird species to fly. 
From this, two hypotheses may arise for how this bird spices 
found itself inhabiting the island. The first hypothesis would be 
that a few birds from the mainland were carried to the island be-
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cause of a massive storm and then reproduced while on the island. 
This ultimately resulted in the birds populating the island. A sec-
ond hypothesis would be that over time the island drifted farther 
and farther from the mainland, due to continental drift, until the 
bird species could no longer fly back to the mainland and where 
trapped on the island. These two hypotheses equally explain the 
phenomenon of finding the small bird species on the uncharted 
island.  
The second deficiency in the hypothetico-deductive meth-
od is that the method “makes no reference to the initial plausibil-
ity of the hypothesis being evaluated”.16 In other words, this mod-
el cannot give us any notion or measure of if the hypothesis has 
any merit whatsoever before evidence is collected. This would 
allow any hypothesis to be stated regardless of how implausible 
the hypothesis may be. We would be forced to run tests to deny 
the hypothesis instead of focusing on the hypotheses that are 
more plausible. These two shortcomings illustrate that there is a 
need for a theory of confirmation in scientific inquiry that can 
limit the deficits of this classic model. 
This deficiency can be shown in the example previously 
given, regarding how the birds came to inhabit the island. Let us 
say that a person gives a third hypothesis to explain the phenome-
non. The third hypothesis being that the birds are on the island 
because they built a boat and collectively floated their way to the 
island. Instead of focusing our resources and attention on the two 
hypotheses previously given, that the bird’s inhabitance of the 
island was due to a large storm or continental drift, we would be 
forced to investigate this third implausible hypothesis. 
The Positives of Using Bayesian Methodology 
As previously argued, the hypothetico-deductive model 
does not allow for the comparison or choosing between two theo-
ries that explain the same observed phenomena. In this model 
these two hypotheses would be equally viable. However, Bayesi-
an probability can be used to create a “Bayesian algorithm for 
theory preference”.17 In other words, by modifying the original 
Bayesian probability equation we can have a value of preference, 
thus allowing us to compare two hypotheses that explain the same 
phenomena. This can be derived from the original Bayesian prob-




(A) / P(B). To derive this algorithm, we must first take the Bayes-
ian probability equation and consider its use for multiple hypothe-
ses. The second hypothesis we will use is a hypothesis contrary to 
hypothesis A, we will use ~A for this contrary hypothesis. A and 
~A are mutually exclusive because they cannot both be true, 
meaning we can state that the P(B) = P(A) x P(B | A) + P(~A) x P
(B | ~ A). From this we can insert the expression into our equation 
and have a result of P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / [P(A) x P(B | A) 
+ P(~A) x P(B | ~A)].  
From this expression, representing two mutually exclusive 
hypotheses, we can move to an expression with any number of 
mutually exclusive hypotheses. This equation would have the 
sum of all the mutually exclusive hypotheses, located in the de-
nominator, this would appear as follows: 
. To complete the algorithm for 
the comparison of two hypotheses we can use the previously stat-
ed equation for multiple distinct hypotheses. By using i = 1 and i 
= 2 for each hypothesis respectively, we can write out the above 
equation for each of the two hypotheses. This would give us two 
equations  and 
 , representing the 
probability values of the two hypotheses. The denominators of 
those to equations are exactly the same, because of this when we 
assign them as a ratio we receive the Bayesian algorithm for theo-
ry preference, shown as  . This ratio of 
the two probability values allows us to make determinations on 
which of the two hypotheses is preferable given the same data.  
Observing the value of the ratio can identify the preferred hypoth-
esis, if the ratio is less than 1 we should prefer the hypothesis A1 
and if the ratio is greater than 1 we should prefer hypothesis A2. 
This shows the advantage of using the Bayesian Methodology in 
scientific conformation as we can avoid a major shortcoming of 
the hypothetico-deductive model, not being able to compare hy-
potheses that explain the same phenomena. 
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The second reason why the Bayesian methodology should 
be used is because the hypothetico-deductive model also has the 
deficiency of not having any way to measure the plausibility of a 
hypothesis before any testing is conducted. Plausibility arguments 
are “designed to answer the question ‘is this the kind of hypothe-
sis that is likely to succeed in the scientific situation in which the 
scientist finds himself or herself?’ On the basis of their training 
and experience, scientists are qualified to make such judg-
ments”.18 In other words, by lacking a plausibility argument in the 
hypothetico-deductive model, all hypotheses would require test-
ing to determine their validity. The Bayesian methodology works 
differently and in fact has a plausibility argument for limiting ir-
rational hypotheses. The subjective prior probability value, based 
on a scientist’s degree of confidence in a hypothesis, can act as a 
gage for plausibility. When a scientist has a low degree of confi-
dence in a hypothesis they would assign a prior probability value 
that is reflective of this degree of confidence. This value means 
that we can then use the expertise of scientists to limit or disre-
gard those hypotheses with low prior probability values. This lim-
iting will allow us to test only the hypotheses that experts feel are 
plausible and thus are worth taking the time to formulate experi-
ments. By accounting for prior probabilities the Bayesian model 
has a way to limit the irrational hypotheses and is thus a superior 
model for scientific inquiry.  
Critique – Subjective Prior Probabilities 
Given how Bayes’ theorem can be utilized in scientific 
confirmation and can be viewed as preferential to a classic model 
for scientific confirmation, I will begin to analyze the critiques of 
using Bayesian methodology in scientific inquiry. The first cri-
tique stems from the subjectivity of the prior probability values, 
these are the initial values assigned to the hypothesis by the indi-
vidual, as previously shown. The subjectivity of priors “can seem 
to be a weakness because Bayesianism cannot criticize very 
strange initial assessments of probability. And, one might think, 
where you end up after updating your probabilities must depend 
on where you start”.19 In other words, there can be a large varia-
tion in the way individuals assign the prior probability value of a 
hypothesis, based on their individual degree of confidence in the 
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hypothesis. It can then be argued that because the prior probabili-
ties may be drastically different the subsequent posterior proba-
bilities, the probability values after evidence is considered, will 
also be drastically different.  
I would argue against the notion that the subjectivity of 
prior probabilities can lead to drastically different posterior prob-
abilities. No matter how divergent the prior probabilities regard-
ing a hypothesis are scientists are highly likely to converge on a 
similar probability value given enough information. This can be 
seen in the previous example regarding why a bird species in cur-
rently inhabiting an island far from the mainland.  
Let us say that two scientists are in disagreement regard-
ing the first hypotheses, that a few birds from the mainland were 
carried to the island because of a massive storm and then repro-
duced while on the island, and its ability to predict why the birds 
are now on the island. For simplicity I will use the letter A to rep-
resent the hypothesis and the letter B to represent the phenomena 
of finding the birds 5,000 miles from the mainland. In the exam-
ple scientist one, assigns a relatively low probability value to hy-
pothesis A, P(A) = 0.2. The assigning of this low probability is 
due to scientist one’s reasoning that a storm could not carry the 
small birds the needed 5,000 miles to reach the island. Based on 
the scientist’s degree of confidence, scientist two assigns a differ-
ent probability value to hypothesis A, P(A) = 0.6. This is a rela-
tively higher probability value than the value assigned by scientist 
one and reflects scientist two’s reasoning that a storm a sufficient 
size could carry the small birds 5,000 miles from the mainland.  
Suppose that a case was recently discovered where birds 
were swept up into a hurricane-sized storm and were flung 6,000 
miles from their original location. This means that B has been 
confirmed through an experiment to follow from hypothesis A. 
Each of the two scientists would then need to put these probabil-
ity values into the Bayesian model. Their previous probabilities 
would then be altered by a factor of P(B | A) / P(B). Given that B 
was confirmed experimentally to follow from hypothesis A, then 
P(B | A) = 1. We can then insert this value into the equation and 
see that the prior probability is now altered by a factor of 1/P(B). 
P(B), the probability value assigned to the evidence B when the 
validity of the hypothesis is not assumed, must then be set by the 
27 
 
Bayesian Methodology As a Tool for Scientific Confirmation 
two scientists. Scientist two, who assigned a relatively high prob-
ability to A, will see B as more likely to occurred and will thus 
assign a probability value that is relatively higher, P(B) = 0.8. 
Scientist one, who assigned relatively low probability to A, will 
see P(B) it be more unlikely and will then assign a probability 
value that is relatively low, P(B) = 0.3. When these values are 
then entered into the Bayesian model we find that P(A | B) for 
scientist one equals 1 x 0.2 / 0.3 = 0.66 and the P(A | B) for scien-
tist two equals 1 x 0.6 / 0.8 = 0.75.  The posterior probability val-
ues for the hypothesis are much closer for the two scientists, 0.66 
and 0.75 respectively, than the prior probabilities, 0.2 and 0.6 re-
spectively. This shows that as more evidence supporting hypothe-
sis A comes to light, and is available to both scientists, they will 
converge on a similar posterior probability value for the hypothe-
sis. 
 
Critique – Science as Objective Inquiry 
One critique of the Bayesian methodology touched on by 
Colin Howson and Peter Urbach arises from the perceived re-
quirement for objectivity in science as it relates to the subjectivity 
of the prior probabilities in the Bayesian method. It is argued that 
objectivity is “ideal for scientific inquiry, as a good reason for 
valuing scientific knowledge, and as the basis of the authority of 
science in society”.20 In other words, maintaining objectivity in 
scientific inquiry allows for the authority of scientific knowledge 
in our society. This allows people without an understanding of 
science or scientific inquiry to trust the claims and theories of sci-
entists. Objectivity is science “contends that science should be 
value-free and that scientific claims or practices are objective to 
the extent that they are free of moral, political and social val-
ues”.21 This requirement of objectivity, that no values should be 
used in science, is extended to all aspects of scientific inquiry. 
Under this notion of objectivity no values can be used in the mak-
ing of a hypothesis or the gathering of evidence and so on.  
Colin Howson and Peter Urbach display an argument, 
against the Bayesian methodology, from “an influential school of 
thought, which denies that there should be any subjective element 
in theory-appraisal at all”.22 This school of thought believes that 
subjectivity has no place in science. The desire for objectivity in 




this school of thought, states, “as measuring merely psychological 
tendencies, theorems respecting which are useless for scientific 
purposes”.23 This shows how strongly these individuals feel re-
garding the use of subjective degrees of confidence in assigning 
probabilities. These individuals feel that “science is objective to 
the extent that the procedures of inference in science are”.24 This 
is not the case in the Bayesian methodology as the prior probabil-
ities reflect the personal degree of confidence, and the procedures 
of inference are constrained only by Bayes’ Theorem.  
Due to the subjectivity of the priors, there is the fear that a 
lack of consistency may arise from this methodology. Edwin 
Thompson Jaynes, who also an ascribes to this school of thought, 
goes on to claim, “the most elementary requirement of consisten-
cy demands that two persons with the same relevant prior infor-
mation should assign the same prior probabilities…objectivity 
requires that a statistical analysis should make use, not of any-
body’s personal opinions, but rather the specific factual data on 
which those opinions are based”.25 If individuals ascribing the 
prior probabilities were assigning based exclusively on the rele-
vant information then there would be absolute consistency with 
regards to the values assigned to the prior probabilities of the 
same hypothesis. This is not the case however as individuals are 
rarely in agreement on the prior probability value assigned to a 
given hypothesis. 
The lack of consistence must then be questioned. Why are 
the individuals assigning different prior probabilities when they 
have the same relevant information? The prior probability values 
are formed by the degree of confidence of the scientist, so it is 
possible that in some cases the degree of confidence is impacted 
by the beliefs and values of the scientist. In light of this, if the be-
liefs of the individual scientists are used for the formation of 
probability values there is a concern that the input of beliefs on 
the part of the scientists will bias the prior probability values and 
cause the inconsistency we see. If scientist’s can skew the prior 
probability values with the input of their own beliefs then the 
Bayesian method does not satisfy this value-free objectivity. 
I, however, argue against this need for value-free objectiv-
ity in science because the need of value-free objectivity is too 
high a standard for scientific inquiry.  Scientific inquiry should 
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rather strive for a less strict objectivity, something closer to ra-
tionality. While value-free science is important when gathering 
data and accepting which hypothesis accurately explain the world, 
it is not necessary when deciding which topics or hypothesis to 
research, as is done with the prior probability values.  
If we regard science as a value-free objective inquiry 
when crafting hypothesis then we are, in a sense, taking the scien-
tists out of science. We would be classifying science as some-
thing that any individual could do regardless of background, be-
cause the individual beliefs of scientists are not a part of the pro-
cess. Scientific inquiry is not a static pursuit, done without the 
subjective individual, it is an active pursuit where scientists input 
their ideas and values based on what they have learned and expe-
rienced. Instead of demanding value-free objectivity in science 
we should demand “that the investigator make every effort to 
bring all of his or her relevant experience in evaluating hypothe-
ses”.26 In other words, when crafting hypothesis and assigning 
prior probabilities values to them, scientist should use their rele-
vant experience to make decisions. Instead of the subjectivity of 
the priors being seen as a negative it should be seen as a positive. 
We should allow scientists to use what they have learned to influ-
ence their reasoning in regards to their degrees of confidence and 
assigning of probability values.  
This call to have rationality or to only use relevant experi-
ences when evaluating a hypothesis can also reduce the fear of 
basis in science. When only using relevant information a scientist 
will not bring in personal biases and will rather only utilize expe-
riences of dealing with similar problems. These relative experi-
ences will then help the scientist to preform science in a way that 
reflects what he or she has learned. Allowing scientists to use 
their experiences will then benefit future scientific pursuits as in-
dividuals learn from past mistakes. In light of this, Bayesian 
methodology not only improves on the shortcomings of the clas-
sical method but also fulfills a needed requirement of rationality 
used in scientific inquiry. 
 
Conclusion 
 I opened this paper with a discussion of Probability Theo-




probability and subjective probability. From this, I went on to dis-
cuss how subjective probability illustrates how probability can be 
seen as an individual’s degree of confidence in a belief sentence. 
In light of this, I showed that we have beliefs that are conditional-
ly related to each other. In other words, our degree of confidence 
in a belief can be influenced by our degree of confidence in other 
related belief. From this understanding, I described the mathemat-
ics behind Bayesian Probability, demonstrating that Bayes’ Theo-
rem relates conditional probabilities with external information. 
The mathematics allowed me to show how new information al-
lows us to influence the probability of a given belief. In light of 
this, I demonstrated how a frequentist derived probability value 
could be used to improve a subjectivist probability value. Due to 
these two interpretations working together in Bayes’ Theorem, I 
maintain that we no longer need to interpret probability values 
using only one interpretation of Probability Theory. Ultimately, I 
concluded this discussion by showing how human reasoning im-
proves due to the use of new information and from this builds a 
more prepared mind to assign probabilities. 
 Given this, I moved to a discussion regarding Bayesian 
probability as it relates to scientific confirmation, looking at both 
the strengths and weaknesses of using the Bayesian methodology. 
I first outlined the classical methodology used for confirmation of 
scientific theories, the hypothetico-deductive model. From this I 
illustrated the shortcomings of the model, highlighting three ma-
jor issues. Given these issues, I highlighted how Bayesian meth-
odology can be used as a way to confirm hypotheses in science, 
while also bypassing the problems associated with the hypotheti-
co-deductive model. I then articulated a critique of the Bayesian 
methodology, which states that because prior probabilities are 
subjective two scientists can have drastically different prior prob-
abilities for the same hypothesis and that this prior bias will affect 
the posterior probabilities as well. In light of this critique, I argue 
that the input of subsequent evidence should, in the case of a sci-
entist with definite values but an open mind, lead to correction of 
unwarranted bias.  
Another critique of using the Bayesian method was then 
analyzed and in doing so displayed how a subjective probability 
theory would not supply the necessary objectivity that is seen as 
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the ideal for scientific inquiry. From this critique I argued that the 
need of objectivity is too high a standard for scientific inquiry and 
that we rather should strive for rationality. Using Bayesian proba-
bility was then shown to have no issues supplying this newly re-
quired rationality for scientific inquiry. Ultimately, I concluded 
that Bayesian methodology is a useful tool for scientific confir-
mation because it lacks the shortcomings of the classic model and 
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